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long-term memory (LTM) as an “object token” representing a spe-
cific perceived instance of an object, with a pointer to the episodic 
memory representing the context in which the object appeared 
(reviewed by Treisman, 2006; Zimmer and Ecker, 2010). Such LTM-
resident object tokens are taken to mediate the re-  identification 
across perceptual episodes of familiar individual objects, as distinct 
from novel members of familiar categories of objects; they thus dif-
fer structurally and functionally from LTM-resident, feature-based 
category representations (Zimmer and Ecker, 2010).
While the functions subserved by the object file clearly require 
access to location information encoded by the dorsal visual stream 
and optionally carry feature information encoded by the ventral 
stream, a neurofunctional implementation of object files has yet 
to be proposed. Pylyshyn (2009) characterizes the individuation of 
objects as “primitive and nonconceptual” (p. 13) and as something 
that the early visual system is “‘wired’ to do” (p. 32), but offers no 
mechanism for how this task is accomplished. Baillargeon (2008) 
similarly characterizes the assumption that perceived objects persist 
through time as an innate default assumption of human beings. 
Flombaum et al. (2008) note that judgments of object persistence 
depend critically on the perception of spatiotemporal continuity 
and describe several additional “principles” that object persistence 
judgments appear to follow, including assurance of object cohesion 
and minimization of distance traveled and relative motion (p. 143), 
but offer no account of where or how these principles – actually heu-
ristics – are implemented. On the purely functional level, neither the 
criteria that determine whether an apparent   spatiotemporal path 
IntroductIon
It is now well accepted that the human ability to perceive the visual 
world as composed of discrete, persisting entities rests on the con-
struction of intermediate visual representations, termed “object 
files” by Kahneman and Treisman (1984), that bind spatial and 
featural information to form “objects” that can be tracked as their 
apparent locations, sizes, and surface features change through time 
(reviewed by Treisman, 2006; Scholl, 2007; Flombaum et al., 2008). 
Instantiation of an object file is what mechanistically distinguishes 
perceiving a persisting object at some location from perceiving 
a cluster of features of the local background at that location; in 
decision-theoretic language, an object file implements a prior prob-
ability of unity that the referenced object is persistent through time, 
and hence capable in principle of motion. Object files are standardly 
conceived of as containers, analogous to file folders, labeled by the 
current location of and containing the currently bound features 
of a perceived object (Flombaum et al., 2008). Treisman (2006) 
emphasizes that while object files as standardly conceived mediate 
the comparison of current to immediately previous-location and 
feature information, they do not maintain even brief histories of 
objects; current information over-writes and hence erases previous-
location and feature information when an object file is updated. As 
noted by Leslie et al. (1998), object files labeled by current location 
serve as “sticky indices” that point to but do not (unless they contain 
featural information) describe objects, thus capturing the func-
tion of “direct reference” defined by Pylyshyn (1989, 2009). Given 
sufficient attention, the contents of an object file can be written to 
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in LTM-resident representations raises the possibility of alterna-
tive developmental pathways in which the typical functioning of 
these mechanisms is disrupted, i.e., in which trajectory information 
dominates feature information in recorded object tokens and in 
categories generalized from them. It is shown that such an alternate 
developmental pathway would be expected to produce cognitive 
outcomes with many of the characteristics of autism spectrum 
disorders (ASD), including biological motion and other “whole 
object” perception deficits (reviewed by Simmons et al., 2009), low 
central coherence (Happé and Frith, 2006), language-learning dif-
ficulties (reviewed by Tager-Flusberg et al., 2009), and obsession 
with repetitive motions (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 1999). 
It is suggested that the “systemizing” cognitive style defined by 
Baron-Cohen (2002, 2008), which emphasizes attention to abstract 
forms and causal structure and is highly prevalent among scientists, 
mathematicians, and engineers, may be a developmental outcome 
associated with relatively weak feature dominance in object-token 
encoding.
Background: trajectorIes and oBject persIstence 
In the context of the standard oBject fIle concept
Beginning with the classic studies of Burke (1952) that defined the 
tunnel effect, extensive experimental work has demonstrated that 
some, but not all, trajectories of simple geometric shapes indi-
cate persistent objecthood to cognitively typical adult observers. 
A simple shape moving continuously across an uncluttered scene 
is individuated as a persisting object, even if its surface features 
change, provided that its apparent size does not decrease toward 
0; this dominance of trajectory continuity over featural change is 
preserved even if the trajectory is totally occluded, provided the 
occlusion is brief (Scholl, 2007; Flombaum et al., 2008). Trajectory 
continuity indicates persisting objecthood even when the “object” 
cannot be distinguished from the background in a static scene 
(Gao and Scholl, 2010), indicating that trajectory continuity does 
not require the detection of static boundaries. However, occlu-
sion accompanied by kinematically significant delays or trajectory 
changes disrupts perception of a persisting object, even if perceived 
features (other than location) do not change; hence human beings 
do not always follow “Leibniz’s Law” of the identity of indiscerni-
bles, even in situations where only one object of a given kind is 
present. Flombaum and Scholl (2006), for example, show that the 
perception of object persistence is disrupted by (1) occlusion for 
1 s in trajectories for which occlusion for 180–320 ms would be 
expected from the perceived motion; (2) an occluded horizontal 
shift in an observed horizontal trajectory; and (3) “implosion” prior 
to occlusion, even if the implosion does not shrink the apparent 
size of the imploding object to 0. Object persistence is similarly 
disrupted if an observed moving object appears to split into two 
identically featured copies (Scholl, 2007). The principles of object 
cohesion and of minimizing distance traveled and relative motion 
(Flombaum et al., 2008) capture some general features of these 
observations,  but  not  their  kinematic  details.  The  systematic 
dependence of the perception of objecthood on kinematic details 
of the observed trajectory in part motivates the widespread assump-
tion that at least some components of “folk physics” are innately 
specified (e.g., Pinker, 1997; Baillargeon, 2008).
is sufficiently continuous to indicate objecthood (Flombaum and 
Scholl, 2006; Flombaum et al., 2008), nor the characteristic devel-
opment of these criteria during infancy (reviewed by Gerhardstein 
et al., 2009) are fully understood. The relationship between criteria 
for objecthood based on spatiotemporal continuity and the crite-
rion of object cohesion, which is often taken to be equally primitive 
(Scholl, 2007; Baillargeon, 2008; Flombaum et al., 2008), is also 
poorly understood, especially in cases in which coherently moving 
but unbounded collections of objects, such as point-light walkers or 
schools of fish, are perceived as single objects. Finally, it is unclear 
how a representation that does not encode the recent history of an 
object can enforce inferred criteria of spatiotemporal continuity or 
cohesion: it is not clear how a “compatible match” (Treisman, 2006) 
between current and immediately previous states of a candidate 
object can be computed on a step-by-step basis without a stored 
representation of either average velocity or at least two previous 
locations. Hence while it has considerable heuristic value, it is dif-
ficult to regard the standard object file concept as providing an 
adequate functional model of visual object persistence judgments 
or object individuation.
Motivated by the early development of motion perception in 
infancy (Gerhardstein et al., 2009) and by recent work showing both 
that continuous motion can confer objecthood even in the absence 
of static distinguishability from background (Gao and Scholl, 2010) 
and that dorsal-stream visuomotor networks downstream of the 
medial–temporal (MT) motion-detection area are involved ubiq-
uitously in the interpretation of observed motions (reviewed by 
Gazzola and Keysers, 2009; Nassi and Callaway, 2009), the present 
paper proposes that the specific recognition of trajectories underlies 
and drives visual object persistence and hence object individuation. 
On this proposal, an object file consists of location and feature 
information bound to one of a finite number of recognizable tra-
jectories, and that all and only location-feature clusters so bound 
are individuated as persistent objects. This proposal thus directly 
challenges the view that object files do not encode history. A func-
tional model based on this proposal is developed, and shown to 
be not only consistent with available anatomical, cognitive, and 
developmental data, but also capable of organizing and explaining 
data that are not easily accommodated within the standard object 
file concept.
By incorporating trajectory information into the object file, the 
model proposed here raises two issues not explicitly dealt with by 
the standard object file concept. First, human beings can, at least 
after the first few months of infancy, individuate stationary clusters 
of features as persisting objects based on segmentation and featural 
criteria alone. Second, LTM-resident object tokens represent objects 
largely independently of their trajectories in any particular observa-
tional episode; if they did not, they could not subserve their func-
tion of re-identifying objects across contexts. As will be discussed 
in detail below, the individuation of stationary objects requires 
a mechanism by which feature-driven categorization instantiates 
object files in a top-down fashion, while the encoding of sufficiently 
general object tokens requires a mechanism for the suppression of 
trajectory information prior to encoding. These mechanisms share 
a functional requirement that feature information dominates tra-
jectory information during the process of binding a current object 
file to an LTM-resident object token or category. The existence 
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tracking is facilitated by repeated experience with specific trajecto-
ries at 4 months (von Hofsten et al., 2007; Johnson and Shuwairi, 
2009), and such experience-based trajectory learning is robust by 
6 months (reviewed by Rakison, 2007). These observations argue 
against the notion that a single set of innately specified trajectory-
based heuristics is expressed in both infants and adults. As noted 
by Bremner et al. (2007), they also argue against either the innate 
specification of physically plausible trajectories, or the learning of 
physically plausible trajectories on the basis of unstructured obser-
vational experience, as explanations of the observed trajectory-
based criteria for object persistence.
While the occlusion and MOT studies briefly reviewed above 
raise the questions of what trajectory-based criteria drive the per-
ception of object persistence, and of how such criteria could be 
implemented, studies employing point-light displays, and in par-
ticular point-light walkers (Johansson, 1973; reviewed by Puce and 
Perrett, 2003; Blake and Shiffrar, 2007), raise the question of how 
boundary-less and hence non-cohesive objects are individuated 
and tracked through time. A point-light walker is effectively an 
identical-feature MOT display in which the perceptual task is to 
individuate a composite object by categorizing it on the basis of 
collective motion criteria alone. Even newborns display a preference 
for an upright point-light walker over an inverted one (Simion et al., 
2008). By 6 months, infants are able to extract overall trajectory 
information from such displays, indicating that they have success-
fully identified the point-light walker as a coherently moving object 
(Kuhlmeier et al., 2010). Adult recognition of point-light walkers 
as coherently moving objects requires less than 100 ms (Pavlova 
et al., 2006), comparable to the visual short-term memory (VSTM) 
consolidation times of adults (50 ms; Vogel et al., 2006) and infants 
older than 7.5 months (no more than 300 ms; Oakes et al., 2006), 
and to adult unimodal binding times for components of an episodic 
event file (240–280 ms; Zmigrod and Hommel, 2010). Accounting 
for the human ability to perceive point-light walkers as persisting 
objects in the context of the standard object-file concept would 
require postulating either that object files corresponding to the indi-
vidual point lights are organized into a coordinated multi-object 
representation in substantially less than half the time normally 
required for unimodal feature binding, or that a single object file 
labeled by a rapidly computed overall object location somehow 
tracks all of the individual point lights simultaneously, in either case 
without the maintenance of history information. Neither of these 
options is consistent, at least prima facie, with the mirror-neuron 
based, global motion detection mechanisms typically invoked to 
explain such data (reviewed by Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; 
Dinstein et al., 2007; Cattaneo and Rizzolatti, 2009).
In summary, the available data challenge the standard object 
file concept on several fronts. First, it is not clear how the complex 
requirements on trajectories that indicate the continuous motion 
of a persistent object could be computed from simple principles 
such as distance or motion minimization applied to current and 
immediately previous locations alone. Second, it is unclear, without 
a specified implementation of the requirements on trajectories, 
how the developmental timecourse or the characteristic infant 
specializations of these requirements are to be explained. Third, 
it is fundamentally unclear, especially in the MOT context, what 
Multiple-object tracking (MOT) studies using simple geomet-
ric shapes with identical surface features indicate that trajectory 
continuity is sufficient to distinguish objects picked out as “tar-
gets” from distractors, even in the presence of occluders, provided 
that no more than four objects must be so identified (reviewed by 
Scholl, 2009). However, trajectory continuity in the MOT context 
is not sufficient to individuate the target objects from each other, 
indicating that while multiple identically featured objects can be 
tracked, the final locations of individual objects cannot be reliably 
associated with their trajectories (Pylyshyn, 2004; Scholl, 2009). 
As in the case of single object tracking, implosion disrupts object 
persistence in MOT (Scholl, 2009). Trajectories that cross or closely 
approach also disrupt tracking (Shim et al., 2008), even in para-
digms in which most of the objects move coherently in straight 
lines (Ma and Huang, 2009). If target objects have distinguishing 
features that allow individuation, MOT performance improves, 
but this improvement vanishes if targets and distractors share fea-
tures (Makovski and Jaing, 2009a,b). If multiple objects must be 
tracked along trajectories that terminate behind an occluder, feature 
information dominates trajectory information in object individu-
ation (Hollingworth and Franconeri, 2009). As Hollingworth and 
Franconeri (2009) point out, in real-world MOT tasks such as free-
way driving, featural information is critical in determining which 
currently perceived object is the continuation of a some particular 
previously observed object across few-second gaps in observation. 
Scholl (2009) interprets the failure of object individuation in MOT 
with identically featured objects as indicating that MOT is carried 
out “in the present,” with only the current and immediately previ-
ous locations of an object available for heuristic determinations 
of sameness (i.e., persistence) or difference (i.e., replacement by a 
distinct object) at each timestep, and with previous-location infor-
mation “flushed” after each same/different determination is made. 
Experiments with differently featured objects, in which featural 
input contributes to individuation, have not assessed the ability 
of subjects to recall the starting points of or trajectories followed 
by each target object.
Adult-like abilities to individuate objects based on their trajec-
tories develop progressively during infancy (Gredebäck and von 
Hofsten, 2007; Gerhardstein et al., 2009); however, the heuristics 
that appear to govern infants’ perceptions of object persistence dif-
fer in some cases from those of adults. As do adults, 4-month-old 
infants interpret occluded trajectories as continuous if the periods 
of occlusion are short; unlike adults, infants appear unable to per-
ceive object persistence across large occluders even if the occlusion 
time is consistent with the object’s observed velocity (Bremner 
et al., 2005). Again as do adults, 4-month-old infants interpret an 
occluded horizontal shift in a horizontal trajectory as indicating a 
novel object (Bremner et al., 2007). However, Bremner et al. (2007) 
also show that both an occluded 90° “bounce” and an 18° diagonal 
trajectory briefly occluded by a vertical occluder are interpreted 
as discontinuous, but that a diagonal trajectory occluded by an 
occluder placed at 90° to the trajectory is interpreted as continu-
ous. Predictive tracking of occluded horizontal trajectories based 
on observed velocity improves during the first year, but again like 
adults, infants interpret trajectories in which objects implode or 
disappear prior to brief occlusions as discontinuous, even if the 
object re-appears at a time and place consistent with its observed 
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persistence   judgments and object individuation. The STR model 
characterizes an object file as a transient, VSTM-resident co-acti-
vation and hence temporal binding of dorsal-stream trajectory 
and current location information with ventral-stream current 
shape and surface feature information. This model extends and 
modifies the standard object-file concept in three fundamental 
ways. First, it proposes a specific implementation of the indexing 
function, the “file folder” of the object file. Second, it adds history 
to the object file in the form of a trajectory to which the current 
location is attached. Third, it proposes that recognized trajectories 
for persisting objects are not computed on a step-by-step basis 
from current and immediately previous-location information, but 
are rather specifically recognized as global features of an unfolding 
event. The STR model has six basic implications, as discussed in 
the six subsections that follow.
trajectory recognItIon Is lImIted, specIfIc, and hIerarchIcal
All trajectories begin as vectors in the topographic space defined 
by visual area V1. Compact sets of correlated vectors are bounded, 
and 2d velocity is given depth to yield a 3d, segmented, instan-
taneous velocity map as an output from MT (reviewed by Born 
and Bradley, 2005; Kourtzi et al., 2008). A “trajectory” is a time-
sequence of apparent 3d positions of the center (in case of a rotating 
object, the center-of-mass) of a set of correlated segments of this 
MT-encoded instantaneous-velocity segment map over some finite 
time. The rapid perception of point-light displays as coherently 
moving objects indicates that, at least in the case of visual percep-
tion by human beings, these sets do not have to be compact and 
the segments contained within a set do not have to share a single 
3d velocity. Multiple disjoint instantaneous-velocity segments mov-
ing at different speeds in different directions, such as the multiple 
lights of a point-light walker, can be recognized by human beings 
as a set of correlated segments; hence such a correlated set can 
be considered to have a trajectory. A consequence of this defini-
tion is that species or even individuals within a species that imple-
ment different criteria for the recognition of correlations between 
instantaneous-velocity segments will recognize distinct patterns 
of motion as “trajectories.”
The STR model requires that some, but not necessarily all, tra-
jectories be specifically recognized by their curvilinear forms in a 
position- and scale (i.e., subtended-angle) invariant manner. This 
requirements has two parts, as illustrated in Figure 1. First, the STR 
model requires the existence of a finite number of distinct local or 
distributed networks, each of which receives input from MT, that 
recognize paths of compact correlated instantaneous-velocity seg-
ments with specific curvilinear forms in the 3d space defined by 
MT (Figure 1B). These “simple” trajectory recognition networks 
(TRNs) effectively recognize trajectories of compact, bounded 
objects characterized by a single overall instantaneous velocity at 
each time point, such as a rolling ball or a colored disk in a MOT 
display. While the complete set of simple recognizable trajectories is 
not known, some trajectories are known not to be recognizable by 
cognitively typical humans; for example, trajectories that recede to 
visual infinity and then re-appear (Flombaum et al., 2008). Unless 
the spatiotemporal path of a correlated velocity segment in MT 
excites one or more simple TRNs, it will not be recognized as a 
links the object file to the object: how a current location “labels” 
a nascent or newly updated object file has never been explained. 
Scholl (2009) criticizes the notion that object files serve as object-
specific indices in identical-feature MOT trials by pointing out that 
no data-driven mechanism to link the index to the object has been 
proposed; however, as Pylyshyn (2009) points out, the alternative 
notion that target objects are successfully tracked because they serve 
as attentional foci has no explanatory grip without an independent 
criterion of persistent objecthood. Finally, it is unclear how object 
files can represent complex, unbounded displays such as point-light 
walkers as coherently moving objects within the very short time-
frames observed. The functional model outlined below addresses 
these issues by proposing that the object file is neither an initially 
empty container nor a non-descriptive index to which current loca-
tion and surface-feature information are bound, but rather is a 
specific trajectory, implemented by excitation of a specific, post-MT 
visuomotor network, to which current location and surface-feature 
information are bound. As will be shown, this model generates a 
wide variety of testable predictions, some of which are consistent 
with available data, while others of which remain to be tested.
model: specIfIc trajectory recognItIon drIves 
oBject IndIvIduatIon
Following the proposal of Rizzolatti and Matelli (2003) that the 
dorsal visual steam be conceptualized as comprising distinct dorso-
dorsal action-guidance and ventro-dorsal action-interpretation 
streams, it has become increasingly clear that motion information 
is processed in specific ways and for specific uses by a variety of 
cross-modulating but anatomically and functionally distinguish-
able areas of the superior temporal and posterior parietal corti-
ces, with components of the superior parietal lobule (SPL) being 
particularly involved in visual tracking and components of the 
inferior parietal lobule (IPL) being particularly involved in visual 
target selection, object manipulation, and visuospatial attention 
(Nassi and Callaway, 2009). These post-MT motion analysis areas 
and the pre-motor areas with which they are reciprocally con-
nected are consistently shown to be active in both observing and 
executing actions (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Dinstein et al., 
2007; Cattaneo and Rizzolatti, 2009; Gazzola and Keysers, 2009). 
While the vast majority of studies have focused on the perception 
of actions and of biological motion, non-biological motions have 
been shown to activate “mirror” areas typically involved in biologi-
cal motion perception in adults (Schubotz and van Cramon, 2004; 
Engel et al., 2007), and mirror system specificities have been shown 
to be reconfigurable by experience (Catmur et al., 2007, 2008). The 
ability of human beings to interpret simple linear motions of simple 
geometric shapes as intentional and hence biological (reviewed by 
Scholl and Tremoulet, 2000) suggests that, in the right contexts, 
nearly any motion can activate the human mirror system.
Motivated by the considerations outlined above, the present 
paper  proposes  three  core  hypotheses:  (1)  that  all  perceived 
motion  activates  and  is  interpreted  by  post-MT  visuomotor 
areas; (2) that one function implemented by these areas is the 
recognition of specific trajectories; and (3) that an activated tra-
jectory representation is the “index” to which current location 
and surface feature data are bound to form an object file. These 
hypotheses, as elaborated below, define what will be referred to 
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at least into this area; their extension into downstream pre-motor 
areas implicated in mirror function cannot be ruled out. Recent 
lesion and imaging studies suggest that complex motion detectors 
within STS may be specific to human-like biological motions (Pyles 
et al., 2007; Saygin, 2007), while more ventral areas, particularly 
inferior occipital sulcus (IOS), may be specific to complex but not 
human-like motions (Pyles et al., 2007). Networks within or func-
tionally associated with STS have been shown to encode abstracted, 
viewpoint- and scale-independent representations of human-like 
trajectories (Jellema and Perrett, 2006; Grossman et al., 2010), as 
required of complex TRNs by the STR model.
On the STR model, a visually perceived “object” is a coherent set 
of instantaneous-velocity segments, the recent trajectory of which 
is recognizable by either a simple or a complex TRN, and an “object 
file” is a transient binding of the current location and any active 
features of a coherent set of instantaneous-velocity segments to the 
recognized trajectory. A segmented set of correlated instantaneous-
velocity vectors that moves along a trajectory that is not recognized 
by a simple or complex TRN – for example, a segmented set of vec-
tors that appears to disappear and then re-appear – is not perceived 
as an object and no object file is formed. Trajectory-based object 
individuation as proposed by the STR model is fundamentally dis-
tinct from and prior to the featural, segmentation, background-
subtraction, dynamical-systems estimation (e.g., Kalman filter), or 
categorization-based object-individuation methods that are com-
monly employed in object-tracking software systems (reviewed 
by Yilmaz et al., 2006). Such methods all assume that objects are 
persistent by definition, and that the task of individuation is to 
distinguish persistent objects from each other. The TRN model 
provides an implementation for this fundamentally qualitative 
prior assumption that what is perceived continues to exist as “the 
same thing” over the duration of the observation. In the language 
of statistical models of perception and action (reviewed by Maloney 
and Zhang, 2010), it sets the prior probability of objecthood at 
or near unity if a trajectory is recognized, and at or near zero if 
one is not. Decisions about how to act with respect to what is 
perceived, including how to categorize it, are made on the basis of 
this trajectory-recognition based assumption that what is perceived 
either is or is not a persisting object.
The STR model does not require that object persistence judgments 
or object individuation be computed purely bottom-up; indeed as 
discussed in Section “Object Individuation by Segmentation and 
Featural Criteria is Functionally and Developmentally Derivative,” 
it predicts that the individuation of static objects based on segmen-
tation and feature criteria is computed top-down. What is does 
require is that an object file be created before it can be categorized 
by binding to a stored category representation or object token. 
The STR model also does not require that only a single TRN be 
activated in any particular case. Trajectories can be ambiguous, 
and top-down modulation may lead to spurious TRN activation. 
In such a case multiple TRNs may be activated with similar levels 
of activation simultaneously, and an ambiguous object file bind-
ing features to multiple active TRNs and hence multiple perceived 
motions may be created. What the model does require is that any 
object have at least one recognized trajectory. Perceivers may, on 
the STR model, be highly uncertain about how an object has moved 
simple trajectory, the corresponding localized cluster of features 
will not be bound to create an object file, and perception of a per-
sisting visual object will not be experienced.
The second requirement of the STR model is that a finite hierar-
chy of distinct local or distributed networks recognize specific cor-
relations between the activities of simple TRNs. These “complex” 
TRNs effectively recognize trajectories of complex (i.e., articulated, 
fluid, rotating, vibrating, or comprising multiple independently 
moving parts) bounded objects as well as unbounded objects such 
as point-light walkers or the two components of a temporarily 
occluded moving bar. It is assumed that simple TRNs encode tra-
jectories as sequences of time points, with a time resolution on 
the order of the minimal VSTM consolidation time, i.e., 50 ms in 
adults (Vogel et al., 2006) and less than 300 ms in 7.5 month infants 
(Oakes et al., 2006). Detection of correlated activity among simple 
TRNs would, therefore, require greater than this time. As a mat-
ter of parsimony, it is assumed that TRNs incorporate effectively 
continuous local velocity labels as well as spatial labels at each time 
point, rendering the recognition of trajectories velocity-invariant 
(within the dynamic range of the label) as well as position-invariant.
Mirror  neuron  networks  selective  for  specific  manipulative 
actions such as grasping or swinging a hammer (Rizzolatti and 
Craighero, 2004; Culham and Valyear, 2006; Lewis, 2006) clearly 
satisfy the functional requirements of TRNs. At least some cells 
with mirror-like response to specific manipulative actions have 
response times to visual stimuli in the 50–100 ms range (Tkach 
et al., 2007) or less than 200 ms (Mukamel et al., 2010). Such mirror 
cells may be components of simple or complex TRNs, or of pre-
motor systems downstream of TRNs. The specific association of 
SPL with visual tracking and grasping – a salient source of object 
movement, especially in infancy – suggests that simple TRNs may 
be components of or at least originate in this post-MT visuomotor 
area. The well-established role of areas of superior temporal sulcus 
(STS) in biological motion perception (Puce and Perrett, 2003; 
Figure 1 | Schematic representation of the specific trajectory 
recognition (STr) model of object individuation. (A) Compact areas of 
coherent instantaneous velocity are segmented in MT. (B) “Simple” trajectory 
recognition networks (TRNs) respond to specific paths of coherent 
instantaneous-velocity segments in the MT-defined space, with a time 
resolution of ∆t on the order of the VSTM consolidation time. Simple TRNs 
appear to be components of or originate in SPL. (C) “Complex” TRNs respond 
to specific correlations between simple TRN activity, and appear to be 
components of or traverse STS.
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effects of experience with object manipulation on the perception of 
object persistence have not been tested directly, it has been demon-
strated that manipulative experience facilitates the interpretation of 
trajectories as actions by 10 months (Sommerville and Woodward, 
2005), that movement and visual attention are coupled at 3 months 
(Robertson and Johnson, 2009), and that object-manipulation expe-
rience facilitates visually guided behaviors at 3–4 months (Lobo and 
Galloway, 2008). Direct tests of whether observed or performed 
manipulations affect performance of object persistence tasks could 
indicate both the extent to which object classification modulates 
the continuing perception of object permanence, and the extent 
to which trajectories can be associated with multiple objects across 
object categories. For example, prior observations of a ball – some-
thing already recognized as persistent – being bounced by 4-month-
olds may facilitate the perception of the “bouncing” trajectories 
employed by Bremner et al. (2007), in which the “bounce” occurs 
behind an occluder, as indicating persistence. Such facilitation would 
indicate a transfer of a recognized trajectory previously associated 
with a ball to a different kind of object, a moving dot on a screen: 
a kind of transfer across categories that occurs routinely in adults.
By tying object individuation to trajectory recognition, the STR 
model predicts that, in the absence of background or categorical 
knowledge as discussed below, objects moving on unfamiliar or 
ambiguous trajectories would be perceived as non-persistent. The 
trajectories shown in Figure 2, for example, would be expected 
to be perceived as non-persistent by 1-year-olds, and with high 
velocities in the diagonal or occluded segments, even by adults. 
It also predicts that individual differences in the development of 
complex TRNs would generate detectable individual differences 
in the perception of object persistence among children or adults. 
Potentially significant individual differences have typically been 
averaged over in existing studies, but can potentially be assayed 
quantitatively by trajectory-prediction experiments (e.g., Maloney 
and Zhang, 2010).
the decay tImes of trajectory representatIons determIne the 
maxImum occlusIon tImes for persIstIng oBjects
The STR model predicts that the decay times of TRNs, not the 
decay times of motion segments in MT, determine the maximum 
occlusion time over which persistence is detected. The STR model 
in the recent past or how it will move in the immediate future, but 
they are predicted to be rarely if ever uncertain about whether what 
is perceived is a persisting object.
By requiring that trajectory recognition be limited, specific, and 
hierarchical, the STR model provides a framework for understand-
ing how only some spatiotemporally continuous trajectories sup-
port the perception of object persistence, while also explaining how 
complex unbounded displays such as point-light walkers can be 
perceived as single persisting objects. It resolves the question of how 
a local computation based on only current and immediately previ-
ous locations could determine whether a trajectory is indicative of 
objecthood by not requiring such local computations. It explicitly 
predicts that fast-responding, specific TRNs exist downstream of 
MT for every form of trajectory that is quickly recognizable, without 
conscious cognition or the use of external tools such as drawings 
or calculations, by the human brain. As will be considered in more 
depth below, it also provides a mechanism by which trajectories 
can be remembered, and objects categorized or re-identified as 
individuals based on their observed trajectories.
motIon perceptIon and hence oBject IndIvIduatIon develop 
wIth vIsual and manIpulatIve experIence
The STR model bases object individuation on trajectory recogni-
tion; hence it implies that object individuation ability develops as 
trajectory recognition abilities develop. Infants display increasing 
sensitivity to and ability to discriminate between distinct motions 
during the first 6 months (Gerhardstein et al., 2009), a period dur-
ing which grasping, manipulation, and locomotion capabilities are 
rapidly developing (reviewed by Piek, 2006). While early studies have 
attributed motion detection abilities prior to 6 months of age prima-
rily to the maturation of MT, infant abilities to recognize point-light 
walkers as objects (Kuhlmeier et al., 2010), recognize actions such as 
grasping as intentional (Wellman et al., 2008), and recognize repeated 
trajectories sufficiently accurately to perform predictive tracking of 
occluded objects (von Hofsten et al., 2007; Johnson and Shuwairi, 
2009) all indicate the involvement of post-MT networks by the mid-
dle of the first year. Mirror activity has been directly measured by 
electrophysiology at 8 months (Nyström et al., 2009) and 14 months 
(van Elk et al., 2008). Right posterior temporal activity associated 
with brief object occlusion but not with apparent disintegration has 
been measured by electrophysiology at 6 months (Kaufman et al., 
2005). Given this developmental profile for trajectory recognition 
abilities, the STR model predicts that object individuation abilities 
begin to develop by 6 months, significantly improve by 12 months, 
and approach maturity during the second year. Given the close cou-
pling of visuomotor with pre-motor networks, it also predicts that 
infant experience with the manipulation of objects facilitates the 
development of visual object individuation capabilities.
Four-month-old infants in fact display non-adult biases in the 
perception of object persistence, including an apparent indiffer-
ence to large changes in velocity (Bremner et al., 2005) and a bias 
against diagonal and “bouncing” trajectories (Bremner et al., 2007). 
By 12 months, performance on simple occlusion tasks approaches 
adult levels (Gredebäck and von Hofsten, 2007; Flombaum et al., 
2008; Gerhardstein et al., 2009), although the full range of adult-
level occlusion heuristics (e.g., tall objects cannot be fully hidden 
by short occluders) develop more slowly (Baillargeon et al., 2006; 
Figure 2 | Trajectories predicted to be perceived as violating object 
persistence by infants and, at high velocity, by adults. (A) A zig-zag 
trajectory with velocity increasing to maintain a constant value of ∆t between 
extreme points, which is predicted to appear as a single object splitting into 
two objects that follow divergent paths. (B) An occluded zig-zag, which is 
predicted to appear as two objects falling down opposite sides of the occluder.
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in a hard sphere separating Earth from luminous Heaven – that 
is, as features, not as individual, movable objects (reviewed by 
Abrams and Primack, 2001). Only in twentieth century cosmol-
ogy were the “fixed stars” recognized as moving objects. It is not 
clear that Earth’s continents were regarded as objects as opposed 
to features, despite their obvious boundaries, until the twentieth 
century development of plate tectonics. Historical investigation 
of the response of various cultures to “first contact” with entirely 
unfamiliar categories of objects may reveal similar evidence that 
what are now seen as objects have in the past or in different cultures 
been seen as features.
If  segmentation  and  distinctive  features  are  insufficient  for 
object individuation as predicted by the STR model, a mechanism 
is required to instantiate an object file for a static feature cluster 
once feature clusters of that kind have been associated with rec-
ognized trajectories and hence determined to indicate persistent 
objects. Binding of a localized feature cluster to a category provides 
a straightforward mechanism to do this. Hence the STR model 
predicts that object files are constructed by two distinct processes 
and in two distinct temporal sequences. In particular, the STR 
model predicts that in the case of moving objects with recognized 
trajectories, object files are constructed prior to categorization by 
a bottom-up, data-driven process. In the case of static objects, the 
STR model predicts that object files are constructed as a conse-
quence of categorization by a top-down, memory-driven process. 
Bottom-up object files are anchored by trajectory representations 
activated by the dorsal stream. Top-down object files are anchored 
by category representations activated by the ventral stream. The 
“null trajectory” that consists of staying in one place relative to 
the local background is, on this model, implemented by binding 
a categorized cluster of features continuously to a single location: 
stationary uncategorized feature clusters are expected, on the STR 
model, to be perceived as features of their local background, not 
as objects. The general category “object” emerges, on this model, 
as a relatively mature fall-back option for individuating a familiar, 
stationary cluster of features as an object, and hence imputing to 
it the possibility of motion. Transcranial magnetic stimulation or 
high-resolution evoked potential measurements may be able to 
distinguish the top-down versus bottom-up activation time courses 
for the attribution of objecthood predicted by the STR model in 
the contrasting cases of static observation versus observation while 
in motion.
categorIes and oBject tokens encode aBstracted trajectory 
InformatIon
If object individuation by segmentation and featural criteria is 
derivative from object individuation on the basis of recognized 
trajectories, object categories cannot be generalized on the basis of 
segmentation and featural criteria alone. Hence the STR model pre-
dicts that object categories are generalized from object tokens that 
contain trajectory information. Because in general the trajectories 
recorded for a given cluster of features will not be identical, category 
learning will in general involve both abstraction of trajectory infor-
mation and the association of multiple abstracted trajectories with 
a given category. The extent of abstraction of trajectories encoded 
by object categories is expected to be at least that implemented 
predicts, therefore, that up to some saturation time, trajectories 
with longer observed durations prior to occlusion would survive 
occlusion longer than trajectories with shorter observed durations 
prior to occlusion. While the occlusion time is commonly treated 
as a variable to be manipulated in occlusion tasks, the duration of 
observation prior to occlusion is not. If such a prior-observation 
duration effect is observed, measuring the duration at which it 
saturates would provide an indirect measure of the dynamic range 
of TRN activation.
oBject IndIvIduatIon By segmentatIon and featural crIterIa 
Is functIonally and developmentally derIvatIve
Children and adults readily individuate stationary objects using 
segmentation and featural criteria, while young infants tend to 
rely on motion criteria alone for object individuation (Flombaum 
et al., 2008). It is often assumed that the existence of objects as 
free-standing entities separate from the “background” of the 
world is an innately specified foundational category (Treisman, 
2006; Scholl, 2007; Baillargeon, 2008). While the STR model is 
not inconsistent per se with the innate encoding of a foundational 
category “free-standing object,” by providing a mechanism for 
object individuation in the absence of an innate object category 
it suggests that no such category need exist. Moreover, the STR 
model implies that stationary objects of a given type can be indi-
viduated on the basis of segmentation and featural criteria alone 
only after experience with moving objects of that type: it implies 
that whether a particular stationary cluster of features should be 
individuated as an object, as distinct from a cluster of features 
of the local background, is something that must be learned. For 
example, the STR model implies that although infants appear 
to be innately capable of recognizing human faces, they are not 
capable of individuating an object – for example their mother – 
that has a face in the absence of its own motion or the motion 
of other objects sufficiently similar to it. Here “motion” is meant 
to include the discontinuous motions of popping suddenly into 
or out of view, as objects often do in experiments conducted 
using video displays. The STR model thus implies not only that a 
foundational category “free-standing object” is unnecessary, but 
that no such foundational category can specify what is to count 
as an “object” as distinct from a localized cluster of features of 
the background.
While the categorization abilities of infants from 3 months 
onward and children following the onset of language have been 
extensively studied, it is not clear when the overarching category 
“object” becomes effectively deployable, and hence it is not clear at 
what age medium-sized segmented components of a scene become 
individuated as objects by default. Intermediate-level categories for 
objects common to the infant environment, as well as the salient 
higher-level categories “human,” “animal,” and “inanimate object” 
(including living things such as plants) are deployed early in infancy 
(reviewed by Rakison and Yermolayeva, 2010), but members of 
these categories often move or are moved in ordinary settings, and 
specific experiments to determine whether such categories could 
be formed in the absence of motion information have not been and 
for ethical reasons perhaps could not be performed. Historical evi-
dence, however, suggests that segmentation and distinctive features 
are insufficient for object individuation even in adults. In medieval 
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trajectory information is suppressed by the continued, task-driven 
binding of the “target” category, with its general representation that 
inanimate “targets” tend to move along smooth curvilinear trajecto-
ries. Hence subjects would be expected to recall that the target disks 
moved along smooth trajectories, but not what those trajectories 
were. A similar failure of trajectory recall would be expected in 
a MOT experiment in which the disks moved along jerky, non-
smooth trajectories; in this case, subjects would be expected to 
report that the disks appeared to be animate, not inanimate objects.
The encoding of uncategorized object tokens that then serve 
as “proto-categories” by supporting the re-identification of the 
tokened object as an individual present a special case of trajectory 
information suppression. Encoding of fully uncategorized object 
tokens would be expected only in early infancy, prior to the robust 
deployment of the general categories “animate” and “inanimate,” 
or in short-duration or high-noise perceptual situations in which 
neither of these general categories out-competes the other. In such 
situations, the STR model requires that featural information domi-
nates trajectory information in the object token, i.e., that the object-
token encoding process itself suppresses trajectory information 
relative to feature information. Object tokens in which trajectory 
information dominates feature information would be expected, as 
discussed in more detail below, to support re-identification of the 
encoded individual only if the current and previously observed 
trajectories activated the same TRNs.
summary of str model and predIctIons
To summarize, the STR model modifies and extends the standard 
object file concept by proposing that object files are anchored by 
specifically recognized trajectories. It posits the existence of par-
ticular structures within the human, and by extension primate, 
post-MT  visuomotor  systems:  TRNs  specific  to  position-  and 
by TRNs, i.e., the position, orientation, and scale of trajectories 
will always be abstracted, while the duration of a trajectory can be 
expected to be abstracted within category-specific limits.
Extensive data indicate that early developing categories, includ-
ing in particular the categories “human,” “animal,” and “inanimate 
object” and as a subset of the latter “self-propelled object,” contain 
information specifying typical motions (Baillargeon, 2008; Rakison 
and Lupyan, 2008; Luo et al., 2009). While such categories are often 
taken to be innately specified (Karmaloff-Smith, 1995; Baillargeon, 
2008), Rakison and Lupyan (2008) show that categories for animate 
and inanimate objects can be learned from examples that include 
feature and motion information, provided that object persistence 
and individuation are assumed. Expectations about typical trajec-
tories – for example, an expectation of linear motion for inanimate 
objects and erratic or non-linear motion for animals and humans – 
are important components of these learned categories. Constraints 
on possible motions are, in general, important components of sortal 
categories in adults (reviewed by Xu, 2007).
Unlike categories, object tokens represent individual objects 
generalized across the episodes in which they occur (Zimmer and 
Ecker, 2010). An object may execute different trajectories in dif-
ferent episodes; hence object tokens must also encode abstracted 
specifications of multiple observed or inferred possible trajectories. 
Re-identification of an object as the same individual as encountered 
in a previous perceptual episode must, therefore, involve generali-
zation and hence loss of information about its specific previously 
observed trajectory. It is reasonable to suppose that such gener-
alization occurs as a component of the binding process that links 
a current object file to an LTM-resident object token. Hence the 
STR model predicts that object-token binding, like categorization, 
involves loss of trajectory information.
categorIzatIon and oBject-token BIndIng suppress 
trajectory InformatIon In workIng memory
The most straightforward mechanism for suppressing detailed 
trajectory information during the categorization or object-token 
binding processes is downward inhibition within the hierarchy of 
TRNs. If excitations of more general TRNs are assumed to inhibit 
the less-general TRNs immediately below them in the hierarchy, 
binding an object file to a category or object token that is a good 
feature match and hence has high amplitude would be expected to 
ripple inhibition downward through the TRN network, suppress-
ing details of the trajectory anchoring the object file in favor of 
the abstracted trajectory information contained in the category or 
object token. This hypothetical mechanism is illustrated in Figure 3. 
The STR model requires that this mechanism, or one with similar 
effects and timecourse, is implemented during the categorization 
and object-token binding processes.
Suppression of trajectory details by category binding provides 
an explanation for the inability of subjects in MOT trials to recall 
target trajectories that is anticipated by neither Pylyshyn (2004, 
2009) nor Scholl (2009). The initial labeling of some of the disks 
in the MOT display as “targets” categorizes them with a familiar 
category – everyone knows what a “target” is – that the experimental 
instructions associate with transient blinks or a transiently visible 
“T” feature. While the disks are in motion, activation of TRNs 
representing their trajectories is driven from the bottom-up, and 
Figure 3 | Schematic representation of trajectory information 
suppression by binding to an LTM-resident category or object token. The 
observed trajectory is replaced in the newly bound object token by the 
abstracted trajectory encoded by the LTM-resident category or object token, 
while the observed features in the newly bound object token are amplified 
relative to the trajectory. F , feature information; T, trajectory information.
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display object individuation in subjects classified by Systemizing 
Quotient (SQ) scores (Baron-Cohen et al., 2003) would be inter-
esting in this regard.
predIctIon: overly specIfIc encodIng of trajectory 
InformatIon In oBject tokens produces an asd-lIke 
developmental profIle
A complex of differences from typical visual perceptual perform-
ance, including enhancements in the perception of detail and defi-
cits in the perception of overall gestalt, are well-documented in ASD 
(reviewed by Behrmann et al., 2006; Golarai et al., 2006; Mottron 
et al., 2006; Simmons et al., 2009). In particular, both deficits and 
accurate but delayed functioning in the perception of biological 
motion, as executed by point-light walkers, have been reported 
in ASD (Simmons et al., 2009). Recent studies employing point-
light arrays have demonstrated enhanced attention to apparently 
causal but biologically irrelevant correlations in 2-year-olds with 
early diagnoses of ASD (Klin et al., 2009), accurate but delayed 
biological motion detection with concomitant activation differ-
ences across a broad range of visuomotor areas in ASD adolescents 
and young adults (Freitag et al., 2008), and accurate but delayed 
abilities in biological motion detection in ASD adults even in the 
presence of significant noise (Murphy et al., 2009). As the STR 
model predicts significant individual variation in the processing 
of trajectory information, it is of interest to ask whether variations 
in the mechanisms proposed by the model, if taken to extremes, 
would produce outcomes typical of ASD.
As discussed above, the STR model predicts that trajectory 
information is encoded in object tokens, and that object-token 
re-instantiation involves top-down TRN activation. In neurotypi-
cal development, the trajectory information encoded by object 
tokens representing familiar individuals is abstracted during the 
process of category or previous object-token binding. Similarly, 
in neurotypical development, the trajectory information encoded 
by object tokens representing novel, uncategorized individuals is 
suppressed relative to featural information. Suppression of trajec-
tory information in object tokens is critical to the use of object 
tokens for re-identification of individuals, and hence to the ability 
of featurally similar object tokens to support category learning by 
inductive generalization as demonstrated (Rakison and Lupyan, 
2008; see also Gopnik and Tenenbaum, 2007). Hence disruption 
of trajectory information suppression in object tokens represent-
ing uncategorized individuals would be expected to disrupt both 
individual re-identification and category formation.
The human beings most exposed to uncategorized individu-
als, and hence most vulnerable to a failure of trajectory informa-
tion suppression during object-token encoding, are infants who 
have yet to develop robust general categories such as “animate” 
and “inanimate.” If an object-token encoded by an infant during a 
particular perceptual episode E included overly specific trajectory 
information, bound for example to a correctly categorized but novel 
face and facial expression, one would expect the infant to correctly 
re-identify the person observed as “the same individual” across 
episodes only if he or she exhibited the same motions that he or she 
exhibited in E; i.e., the infant’s capability to re-identify the person 
based on featural similarity and abstracted trajectory information 
scale-invariant trajectories. It predicts that one or more TRNs are 
activated by any perceived motion. It predicts that TRNs encode 
motions as sequences of locations of coherent motion segments 
encoded by MT, with a time resolution on the order of 50 ms 
in adults. It predicts that TRNs are arranged hierarchically; the 
lowest-level simple TRNs are expected to originate in SPL, while 
higher-level complex TRNs may be distributed across the parietal–
temporal–frontal mirror network. It predicts that TRNs develop 
with perceptual and manipulative experience. Finally, the model 
predicts that downward inhibition in the TRN hierarchy is respon-
sible for the loss of trajectory information on category or object 
token binding.
The STR model also makes a number of functional predictions. 
It predicts that human beings should find it difficult if not impos-
sible to see “features” as moving, even if they are explicitly told to 
expect the features of an object to move; it predicts, in other words, 
that human observers will instantiate object files, and hence reify 
moving clusters of features as “objects” by default. It predicts that 
trajectory consistency across the initial few episodes of observation 
of a novel individual or category will facilitate object-token encod-
ing or category formation. It predicts that, in a MOT context, the 
trajectories of objects identified as members of specific categories 
(e.g., ducks) will be recalled with greater detail than trajectories of 
objects identified as members of general categories (“targets”). It 
predicts that point-light walker recognition or MOT performance 
should be disrupted by instructions to attend to the trajectory of a 
particular point-light or disk. Finally, it predicts that not just a few, 
but in fact the majority of possible spatiotemporally continuous 
trajectories should disrupt the perception of object persistence, 
especially in infancy and early childhood. It predicts, in other words, 
that the fact that objects of common experience follow relatively 
simple trajectories is neither an accident nor a consequence of 
fundamental physics, but rather reflects the existence of a relatively 
limited set of TRNs in the human visuomotor system.
By positing a mechanism based on specific recognition, the 
STR  model  raises  the  possibility  of  significant  normal-range 
individual differences in trajectory recognition ability, and hence 
in object individuation. Experiments using point-light displays 
of non-human motions, such as those of Engel et al. (2007) or 
Pyles et al. (2007), would be expected to yield a coherent range of 
abilities in the recognition and classification of trajectories within 
the cognitively typical, neurotypical population. The model also 
predicts that variations in the strength of downward inhibition 
in the TRN network, or in the balance between ventral-stream 
feature and dorsal-stream trajectory activation in event percep-
tion, will result in significant differences in the level of specificity 
with which trajectory information is encoded in object tokens and 
categories. Individuals with relatively high dorsal-stream activa-
tion levels would be expected, given suitably rich developmental 
experiences, to form higher-specificity TRNs, and to encode object 
tokens and categories with higher-specificity trajectory informa-
tion. Such individuals would be expected to display higher than 
average interest in events involving similar trajectories, and higher 
than average tendencies to classify events by similarities among 
trajectories. A focus on kinematic and dynamic similarities over 
featural similarities between events is typical of physical scien-
tists, and of “systemizers” (Baron-Cohen, 2002, 2008) in general. 
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delayed and disorganized language learning, as is often observed 
in ASD (Tager-Flusberg et al., 2009). While the symptomatol-
ogy of ASD is extraordinarily complex and single-  mechanism 
accounts of its etiology have been unconvincing (Happé et al., 
2006; Rajendran and Mitchell, 2007), these brief considerations 
do suggest that overly specific encoding of trajectory information 
in object tokens may contribute to the developmental outcomes 
characteristic of ASD.
conclusIon
The  object  file  concept  developed  over  the  last  three  decades 
(Treisman, 2006; Scholl, 2007; Flombaum et al., 2008) suffers a 
number of difficulties: it is not clear how local computations with 
access only to the current and previous locations of an object could 
determine whether its trajectory indicates object persistence; it is 
not clear how object files can be instantiated for disconnected sets of 
objects such as point-light walkers; and it is not clear what happens 
to the precise trajectory information that enabled the perception of 
a persistent object when a permanent object token incorporating 
abstracted trajectory information is encoded. By proposing that 
objects are only perceived as persistent if their trajectories are spe-
cifically recognized by a hierarchical TRN, the STR model resolves 
these difficulties, and provides a framework for interpreting both 
developmental and adult data on object persistence, MOT capa-
bilities, and complex motion recognition. The STR model makes 
a variety of anatomical and functional predictions accessible to 
direct experimental tests.
As  the  mechanisms  proposed  by  the  STR  model  would  be 
expected to vary in their relative specificities and efficiencies among 
individuals, the model predicts significant individual differences 
in  the  perception  of  both  trajectories  and  object  persistence. 
Systemizing as a cognitive style (Baron-Cohen, 2002, 2008) may 
result from a particular configuration of biases in the recognition, 
abstraction and encoding of trajectory information. Extreme vari-
ants in the relative strength of trajectory information encoding in 
object tokens may lead to pathology; in particular, overly specific 
encoding of trajectory information during infancy predicts, within 
the STR model, a complex of developmental outcomes strikingly 
consistent with those observed in ASD. If the STR model is con-
firmed, infant difficulties in the re-identification of individuals 
across episodes in which their perceived motions significantly vary 
would be expected to have value as an early indicator of ASD risk.
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would be compromised. All individual objects are novel to infants 
on their first presentation, so an infant who typically encoded overly 
specific  trajectory  information  in  uncategorized  object  tokens 
would tend to encode multiple, overly trajectory-specific object 
tokens  for  individuals,  and  aberrant,  overly  trajectory-specific 
categories for types. Such overly trajectory-specific object tokens 
and categories would, in turn, not support the development of 
abstracted, viewpoint-invariant and individual-nonspecific com-
plex TRNs. Hence an infant who typically encoded overly specific 
trajectory information in uncategorized object tokens would be 
expected to develop a complex of perceptual phenotypes includ-
ing over-attention to trajectory details, difficulties with the re-
identification of individuals across perceptual episodes, aberrant, 
trajectory-specific categories that cut across normal feature-based 
categories, and insensitivity to the general features of what would 
be regarded by neurotypicals as classes of similar trajectories.
Individuals with ASD are in fact overly attentive to simple, 
repetitive, and specifically non-biological motions (Baron-Cohen 
and Wheelwright, 1999). Infants and children with ASD have dif-
ficulty perceiving point-light walkers as objects and in particular 
as humans (Klin et al., 2009; Simmons et al., 2009); adolescents 
and adults with ASD exhibit delays in point-light walker recogni-
tion that extend to the recognition of complex motions in general, 
and these differences correlate with differences in activation pat-
terns across the visuomotor and mirror networks (Freitag et al., 
2008; Simmons et al., 2009). Children and adults with ASD have 
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